13 ideas
| 18935 | Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer] |
| 18945 | Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer] |
| 18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
| 18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |
| 18947 | Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer] |
| 3144 | Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler] |
| 21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
| 21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
| 21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
| 21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
| 8066 | Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler] |