14 ideas
8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |