34 ideas
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
17596 | Coherence problems have positive and negative restraints; solutions maximise constraint satisfaction [Thagard] |
17597 | Coherence is explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative [Thagard] |
17598 | Explanatory coherence needs symmetry,explanation,analogy,data priority, contradiction,competition,acceptance [Thagard] |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
17602 | Verisimilitude comes from including more phenomena, and revealing what underlies [Thagard] |
17601 | Neither a priori rationalism nor sense data empiricism account for scientific knowledge [Thagard] |
17600 | Bayesian inference is forced to rely on approximations [Thagard] |
17066 | 3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
17064 | 1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart] |
17067 | 4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart] |
17068 | 5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
17069 | 6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart] |
17065 | 2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
17599 | The best theory has the highest subjective (Bayesian) probability? [Thagard] |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |