56 ideas
| 2956 | There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood] |
| 2963 | There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood] |
| 2958 | No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood] |
| 22285 | Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter] |
| 22301 | The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter] |
| 22324 | It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter] |
| 2959 | If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood] |
| 10702 | Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter] |
| 10713 | Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter] |
| 13044 | Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter] |
| 10708 | Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter] |
| 13546 | The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter] |
| 10707 | Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter] |
| 10704 | We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter] |
| 22279 | Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter] |
| 22291 | Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter] |
| 10703 | Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter] |
| 22295 | Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter] |
| 10712 | If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter] |
| 17882 | It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter] |
| 22310 | The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter] |
| 22298 | Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter] |
| 22287 | If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter] |
| 2969 | How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood] |
| 13043 | A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter] |
| 22284 | 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter] |
| 13042 | If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter] |
| 13041 | Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter] |
| 10709 | Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter] |
| 22281 | A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter] |
| 2970 | Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood] |
| 2961 | Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood] |
| 2960 | Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood] |
| 22327 | Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 2952 | A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood] |
| 2964 | How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood] |
| 2951 | Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood] |
| 2953 | Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood] |
| 2967 | We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood] |
| 2966 | Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood] |
| 2955 | If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood] |
| 2950 | Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood] |
| 2954 | Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood] |
| 22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
| 16362 | An identity statement aims at getting the hearer to merge two mental files [Lockwood] |
| 22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |
| 2971 | Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood] |
| 22283 | Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter] |
| 22282 | 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter] |
| 22296 | Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter] |
| 4054 | I may exist before I become a person, just as I exist before I become an adult [Lockwood] |
| 4056 | If the soul is held to leave the body at brain-death, it should arrive at the time of brain-creation [Lockwood] |
| 4055 | It isn't obviously wicked to destroy a potential human being (e.g. an ununited egg and sperm) [Lockwood] |
| 2962 | Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood] |
| 2949 | We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood] |