Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Kathrin Koslicki and Will Kymlicka

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110 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki]
There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki]
In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka]
One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka]
A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka]
Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka]
The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka]
Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka]
Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka]
Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka]
The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka]
We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka]
Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka]
Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka]
We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka]
Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka]
Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka]
Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka]
The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka]
Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka]
'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka]
Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka]
Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka]
Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka]
Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka]
The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka]
Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka]
Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka]
Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka]
Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka]
Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 3. Legal equality
Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka]
Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka]
Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka]
Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka]
Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki]