28 ideas
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
8970 | Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne] |
14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |
14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |