45 ideas
| 9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 22849 | Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet] |
| 22848 | People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet] |
| 22838 | Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet] |
| 22846 | The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet] |
| 22835 | Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet] |
| 22831 | Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet] |
| 22839 | Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet] |
| 22847 | Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet] |
| 22821 | Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet] |
| 22834 | Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet] |
| 22822 | Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet] |
| 22841 | Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet] |
| 22842 | For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet] |
| 22830 | Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet] |
| 22829 | Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet] |
| 22836 | 'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet] |
| 22837 | Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet] |
| 22844 | First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet] |
| 22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
| 22843 | Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet] |
| 22845 | Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet] |
| 22828 | The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet] |
| 22825 | The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet] |
| 22823 | The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet] |
| 22827 | Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet] |
| 22826 | From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet] |
| 22832 | Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet] |