Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Harold Noonan and Francisco Surez

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


28 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez]