144 ideas
6123 | Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks] |
19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
6143 | Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks] |
12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
6135 | A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks] |
14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
6145 | Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks] |
14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
6124 | I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks] |
6134 | Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks] |
14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
6125 | We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks] |
14229 | Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins] |
6142 | The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks] |
14472 | If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson] |
14469 | Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks] |
6137 | Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks] |
6141 | There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks] |
6127 | 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks] |
6131 | Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks] |
6132 | Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks] |
6130 | 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks] |
6138 | It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks] |
6128 | Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks] |
14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
6136 | Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks] |
19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
6133 | If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks] |
14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
6150 | The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks] |
3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
8800 | If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa] |
6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
17060 | Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart] |
12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
6144 | You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks] |
3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
6140 | Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks] |
6149 | Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks] |
3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
6148 | Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks] |
3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |
12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
5122 | Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman] |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
5123 | Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman] |
5124 | If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman] |
5125 | Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman] |
17960 | Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real [Merricks] |
17961 | Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG] |
14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |