70 ideas
| 18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
| 18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
| 18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
| 18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
| 18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
| 18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
| 18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
| 18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
| 18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
| 18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
| 18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
| 18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
| 18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
| 14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
| 8923 | Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride] |
| 14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
| 8926 | For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride] |
| 14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
| 18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
| 18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
| 18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
| 18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
| 21354 | It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride] |
| 21353 | Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride] |
| 21352 | 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride] |
| 16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
| 14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
| 14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
| 14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
| 13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff] |
| 14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
| 14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
| 14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
| 14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
| 14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
| 14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
| 14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
| 14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
| 14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
| 14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
| 14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
| 14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
| 18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
| 14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
| 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
| 14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
| 18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong] |
| 16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
| 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
| 14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
| 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
| 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
| 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
| 11891 | Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P] |
| 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
| 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
| 6356 | Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 9086 | The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga] |
| 9087 | Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga] |
| 16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
| 16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
| 14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
| 9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga] |
| 9084 | Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga] |
| 20704 | A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B] |
| 1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG] |
| 1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG] |