295 ideas
| 21875 | The wisdom of a free man is a meditation on life, not on death [Spinoza] |
| 17230 | If we are not wholly wise, we should live by good rules and maxims [Spinoza] |
| 2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
| 17200 | We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza] |
| 17194 | Reason only explains what is universal, so it is timeless, under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
| 4840 | Reason perceives things under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
| 19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
| 17213 | In so far as men live according to reason, they will agree with one another [Spinoza] |
| 4819 | There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist [Spinoza] |
| 6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
| 16541 | All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza] |
| 6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
| 21864 | Truth is its own standard [Spinoza] |
| 8018 | Spinoza's life shows that love of truth which he proclaims as the highest value [MacIntyre on Spinoza] |
| 6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
| 5641 | For Spinoza, 'adequacy' is the intrinsic mark of truth [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 4816 | A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza] |
| 6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
| 6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
| 6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
| 6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
| 6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
| 20309 | If our ideas are adequate, what follows from them is also adequate [Spinoza] |
| 6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
| 6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
| 6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
| 2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
| 6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
| 6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
| 6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
| 6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
| 17185 | Mathematics deals with the essences and properties of forms [Spinoza] |
| 17197 | The idea of a triangle involves truths about it, so those are part of its essence [Spinoza] |
| 17222 | The sum of its angles follows from a triangle's nature [Spinoza] |
| 6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
| 17174 | Outside the mind, there are just things and their properties [Spinoza] |
| 17176 | The more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has [Spinoza] |
| 17179 | There must always be a reason or cause why some triangle does or does not exist [Spinoza] |
| 6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
| 6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
| 17186 | Men say they prefer order, not realising that we imagine the order [Spinoza] |
| 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
| 6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
| 20127 | Laws of nature are universal, so everything must be understood through those laws [Spinoza] |
| 6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
| 17170 | An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza] |
| 17171 | A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza] |
| 17195 | Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza] |
| 17206 | The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza] |
| 17192 | The 'universal' term 'man' is just imagining whatever is the same in a multitude of men [Spinoza] |
| 17188 | A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza] |
| 5639 | Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 21857 | Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord] |
| 4813 | Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza] |
| 4828 | The essence of a thing is what is required for it to exist or be conceived [Spinoza] |
| 17187 | Essence gives existence and conception to things, and is inseparable from them [Spinoza] |
| 17191 | Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza] |
| 17184 | All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza] |
| 4869 | Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza] |
| 18892 | Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn] |
| 17205 | Only an external cause can destroy something [Spinoza] |
| 12019 | McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn] |
| 6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
| 6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
| 6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
| 6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
| 6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
| 6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
| 6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
| 6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
| 6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
| 17175 | There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza] |
| 6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
| 6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
| 6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
| 17173 | Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza] |
| 17183 | Things are impossible if they imply contradiction, or their production lacks an external cause [Spinoza] |
| 4824 | We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza] |
| 4299 | Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 4839 | Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza] |
| 4822 | Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent [Spinoza] |
| 6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
| 17182 | Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza] |
| 4818 | People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza] |
| 20310 | Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza] |
| 6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
| 17208 | A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza] |
| 17209 | A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza] |
| 5640 | Spinoza's three levels of knowledge are perception/imagination, then principles, then intuitions [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 17211 | Understanding is the sole aim of reason, and the only profit for the mind [Spinoza] |
| 6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
| 21801 | Unlike Descartes' atomism, Spinoza held a holistic view of belief [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
| 17193 | True ideas intrinsically involve the highest degree of certainty [Spinoza] |
| 21863 | You only know you are certain of something when you actually are certain of it [Spinoza] |
| 17199 | A man who assents without doubt to a falsehood is not certain, but lacks a cause to make him waver [Spinoza] |
| 5638 | 'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
| 22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
| 22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
| 22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
| 22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
| 22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
| 22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
| 22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
| 22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
| 22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
| 22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
| 22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
| 7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
| 4831 | If the body is affected by an external object, the mind can't help believing that the object exists [Spinoza] |
| 4865 | The eyes of the mind are proofs [Spinoza] |
| 20306 | Once we have experienced two feelings together, one will always give rise to the other [Spinoza] |
| 6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
| 4835 | Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza] |
| 20308 | Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza] |
| 6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
| 4312 | To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 13073 | To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza] |
| 4833 | The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza] |
| 16198 | Knowledge is the essence of the mind [Spinoza] |
| 17196 | The will is not a desire, but the faculty of affirming what is true or false [Spinoza] |
| 17198 | Will and intellect are the same thing [Spinoza] |
| 17201 | The will is finite, but the intellect is infinite [Spinoza] |
| 21805 | Spinoza held that the mind is just a bundle of ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
| 17204 | Animals are often observed to be wiser than people [Spinoza] |
| 17212 | To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind [Spinoza] |
| 4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
| 21804 | Faculties are either fictions, or the abstract universals of ideas [Spinoza] |
| 2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
| 4832 | If the body is affected by two things together, the imagining of one will conjure up the other [Spinoza] |
| 21869 | Our own force of persevering is nothing in comparison with external forces [Spinoza] |
| 20307 | As far as possible, everything tries to persevere [Spinoza] |
| 21803 | The conatus (striving) of mind and body together is appetite, which is the essence of man [Spinoza] |
| 4836 | The mind only knows itself by means of ideas of the modification of the body [Spinoza] |
| 21861 | Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza] |
| 17216 | The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man [Spinoza] |
| 4814 | A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza] |
| 2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
| 19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
| 4871 | A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza] |
| 21802 | An act of will can only occur if it has been caused, which implies a regress of causes [Spinoza] |
| 4837 | 'Free will' is a misunderstanding arising from awareness of our actions, but ignorance of their causes [Spinoza] |
| 4843 | Would we die if we lacked free will, and were poised between equal foods? Yes! [Spinoza] |
| 4844 | The mind is not free to remember or forget anything [Spinoza] |
| 4311 | We think we are free because we don't know the causes of our desires and choices [Spinoza] |
| 7828 | The actual world is the only one God could have created [Spinoza] |
| 2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
| 21860 | Ideas and things have identical connections and order [Spinoza] |
| 4308 | Mind and body are one thing, seen sometimes as thought and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
| 4846 | We are incapable of formulating an idea which excludes the existence of our body [Spinoza] |
| 7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
| 2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
| 4834 | Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
| 3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn] |
| 23951 | Emotion is a modification of bodily energy, controlling our actions [Spinoza] |
| 23990 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire [Spinoza, by Goldie] |
| 4849 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain and desire [Spinoza] |
| 4864 | An emotion is only bad if it hinders us from thinking [Spinoza] |
| 17203 | Minds are subject to passions if they have inadequate ideas [Spinoza] |
| 7832 | Stoics want to suppress emotions, but Spinoza overcomes them with higher emotions [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 4863 | An emotion comes more under our control in proportion to how well it is known to us [Spinoza] |
| 4841 | People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza] |
| 18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
| 22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
| 22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
| 18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
| 20311 | An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza] |
| 4842 | Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza] |
| 4830 | An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza] |
| 21807 | Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
| 4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
| 6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
| 2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
| 6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
| 22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
| 4309 | Spinoza argues that in reality the will and the intellect are 'one and the same' [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 4838 | Claiming that actions depend on the will is meaningless; no one knows what the will is [Spinoza] |
| 20305 | Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence [Spinoza] |
| 17202 | We are the source of an action if only our nature can explain the action [Spinoza] |
| 21865 | We act when it follows from our nature, and is understood in that way [Spinoza] |
| 21868 | We love or hate people more strongly because we think they are free [Spinoza] |
| 4870 | The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible [Spinoza] |
| 4867 | Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza] |
| 21873 | Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza] |
| 21872 | We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza] |
| 8019 | Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
| 17189 | The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza] |
| 17207 | By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza] |
| 17229 | If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza] |
| 4845 | We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza] |
| 4848 | Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza] |
| 17217 | Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza] |
| 7833 | Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 17224 | If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza] |
| 21870 | Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza] |
| 4860 | Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza] |
| 4847 | Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza] |
| 4859 | Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza] |
| 4851 | Reason demands nothing contrary to nature, and so it demands self-love [Spinoza] |
| 17220 | Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope [Spinoza] |
| 4852 | Both virtue and happiness are based on the preservation of one's own being [Spinoza] |
| 17210 | All virtue is founded on self-preservation [Spinoza] |
| 21871 | The more we strive for our own advantage, the more virtuous we are [Spinoza] |
| 17214 | To act virtuously is to act rationally [Spinoza] |
| 4856 | To live according to reason is to live according to the laws of human nature [Spinoza] |
| 17221 | A man ignorant of himself is ignorant of all of the virtues [Spinoza] |
| 17225 | In a free man, choosing flight can show as much strength of mind as fighting [Spinoza] |
| 17219 | A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza] |
| 4857 | Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza] |
| 17223 | Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza] |
| 17218 | People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza] |
| 17228 | Rational people judge money by needs, and live contented with very little [Spinoza] |
| 4853 | Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza] |
| 4858 | A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza] |
| 4855 | If people are obedient to reason, they will live in harmony [Spinoza] |
| 19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
| 21874 | The ideal for human preservation is unanimity among people [Spinoza] |
| 8020 | Only self-knowledge can liberate us [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
| 19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
| 19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
| 7412 | Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck] |
| 7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
| 19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
| 19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
| 19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
| 19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
| 19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
| 19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
| 19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
| 19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
| 19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
| 17227 | Slavery is a disgraceful crime [Spinoza] |
| 19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
| 19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
| 19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
| 19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
| 19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
| 7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| 19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
| 19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
| 19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
| 19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
| 19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
| 19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
| 19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
| 19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
| 19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
| 19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
| 17226 | The best use of talent is to teach other people to live rationally [Spinoza] |
| 4854 | It is impossible that the necessity of a person's nature should produce a desire for non-existence [Spinoza] |
| 17215 | Animals feel, but that doesn't mean we can't use them for our pleasure and profit [Spinoza] |
| 17190 | We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza] |
| 4826 | Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza] |
| 1587 | Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
| 1588 | For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
| 12731 | Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza] |
| 4821 | An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza] |
| 17177 | In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza] |
| 4850 | A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza] |
| 2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
| 4815 | From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza] |
| 7835 | The key question for Spinoza is: is his God really a God? [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| 7609 | God is the sum and principle of all eternal laws [Spinoza, by Armstrong,K] |
| 19435 | God is not loveable for producing without choice and by necessity; God is loveable for his goodness [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
| 17172 | God is a substance with infinite attributes [Spinoza] |
| 21859 | God has no purpose, because God lacks nothing [Spinoza] |
| 4314 | God is wholly without passions, and strictly speaking does not love anyone [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 12928 | Spinoza's God is just power and necessity, without perfection or wisdom [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
| 17231 | God feels no emotions, of joy or sorrow [Spinoza] |
| 7571 | Spinoza's God is not a person [Spinoza, by Jolley] |
| 4823 | God does not act according to the freedom of the will [Spinoza] |
| 4866 | God is a being with infinite attributes, each of them infinite or perfect [Spinoza] |
| 7829 | God no more has human perfections than we have animal perfections [Spinoza] |
| 4825 | To say that God promotes what is good is false, as it sets up a goal beyond God [Spinoza] |
| 21856 | Spinoza says a substance of infinite attributes cannot fail to exist [Spinoza, by Lord] |
| 17178 | Denial of God is denial that his essence involves existence, which is absurd [Spinoza] |
| 21858 | God is being as such, and you cannot conceive of the non-existence of being [Spinoza, by Lord] |
| 4820 | God must necessarily exist, because no reason can be given for his non-existence [Spinoza] |
| 17169 | Some things makes me conceive of it as a thing whose essence requires its existence [Spinoza] |
| 4817 | If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence [Spinoza] |
| 6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
| 6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |
| 4868 | Trying to prove God's existence through miracles is proving the obscure by the more obscure [Spinoza] |
| 4827 | Priests reject as heretics anyone who tries to understand miracles in a natural way [Spinoza] |
| 17181 | God is the efficient cause of essences, as well as of existences [Spinoza] |
| 12757 | That God is the substance of all things is an ill-reputed doctrine [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
| 4829 | The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God [Spinoza] |
| 17180 | Everything is in God, and nothing exists or is thinkable without God [Spinoza] |
| 7830 | A talking triangle would say God is triangular [Spinoza] |
| 7836 | In Spinoza, one could substitute 'nature' or 'substance' for the word 'God' throughout [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
| 4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |
| 21876 | After death, something eternal remains of the mind [Spinoza] |
| 7831 | Spinoza's theory of mind implies that there is no immortality [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |