Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Charles Taylor and Amie L. Thomasson

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


39 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C]
If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C]
For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C]