Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Brian Davies and David Liggins

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26 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
14231 We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
14232 We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
14233 Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
20712 God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
20701 Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
20702 The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
20703 How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
20694 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
20706 A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
20707 The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
20708 If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / d. Religious Experience
20710 Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B]
20711 A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B]
20709 The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / b. Religious Meaning
20697 One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
20699 Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B]