58 ideas
| 20981 | What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen] |
| 20982 | In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen] |
| 20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
| 20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 20990 | Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
| 20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
| 20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
| 20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
| 20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
| 20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
| 20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
| 20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
| 20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
| 20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
| 20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
| 20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
| 20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
| 20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
| 20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
| 20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
| 20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
| 20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
| 20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
| 20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
| 20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
| 20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
| 20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
| 21005 | A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen] |
| 20983 | The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen] |
| 20987 | The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen] |
| 20984 | A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen] |
| 20986 | A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen] |
| 21001 | Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen] |
| 21002 | Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen] |
| 20979 | Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen] |
| 20999 | Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen] |
| 20993 | Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen] |
| 20995 | Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen] |
| 20998 | Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen] |
| 20997 | The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen] |
| 20996 | All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen] |
| 20988 | Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen] |
| 21000 | If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen] |
| 20980 | You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen] |
| 20978 | Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen] |
| 20985 | Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen] |
| 20994 | We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen] |
| 20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |