512 ideas
| 14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
| 9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
| 14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
| 9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford] |
| 15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
| 7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke] |
| 17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
| 15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
| 11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
| 9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
| 10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
| 12526 | Opposition to reason is mad [Locke] |
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
| 9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
| 11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
| 14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
| 12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke] |
| 16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
| 11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
| 12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke] |
| 12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke] |
| 12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke] |
| 12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke] |
| 12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke] |
| 12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke] |
| 17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
| 15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
| 17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
| 8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke] |
| 12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke] |
| 9560 | S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense [Fine,K] |
| 14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
| 10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
| 13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
| 10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
| 23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
| 17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
| 10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke] |
| 9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
| 12220 | Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K] |
| 11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
| 15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
| 15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
| 15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
| 15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
| 15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
| 15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
| 9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
| 14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
| 15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
| 11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
| 12222 | Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K] |
| 10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
| 10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
| 23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
| 11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
| 9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
| 10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
| 10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
| 10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
| 12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke] |
| 12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke] |
| 12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
| 12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
| 12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
| 7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke] |
| 10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
| 9224 | Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K] |
| 9222 | The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K] |
| 9223 | My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K] |
| 12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
| 15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
| 14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
| 18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke] |
| 10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
| 10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
| 10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
| 12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
| 12554 | Existences can only be known by experience [Locke] |
| 12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
| 12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
| 15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
| 15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
| 14262 | Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K] |
| 17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
| 17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
| 17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
| 17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
| 17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
| 17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
| 17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
| 17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
| 17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
| 17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
| 15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
| 15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
| 15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
| 15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
| 14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
| 11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
| 14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
| 14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
| 14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
| 12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke] |
| 9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
| 10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
| 12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
| 12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke] |
| 15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
| 15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
| 15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
| 9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
| 15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
| 15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
| 17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
| 15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
| 23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
| 23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
| 23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
| 12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke] |
| 12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke] |
| 23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
| 9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
| 9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
| 9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
| 9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
| 9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
| 9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
| 9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
| 23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
| 12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
| 13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke] |
| 12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke] |
| 13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke] |
| 14217 | The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K] |
| 14216 | The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K] |
| 14218 | A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K] |
| 14219 | Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K] |
| 14220 | Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K] |
| 12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke] |
| 12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke] |
| 12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke] |
| 15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke] |
| 15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke] |
| 16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
| 15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke] |
| 7717 | All things that exist are particulars [Locke] |
| 7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke] |
| 12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke] |
| 9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
| 1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke] |
| 12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke] |
| 12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke] |
| 12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke] |
| 12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke] |
| 15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
| 14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
| 13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
| 8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke] |
| 1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke] |
| 12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke] |
| 7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke] |
| 12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke] |
| 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
| 23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
| 13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
| 12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke] |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
| 12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke] |
| 13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
| 13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
| 13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
| 13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
| 13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
| 12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke] |
| 12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke] |
| 13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke] |
| 11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
| 14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
| 16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
| 14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
| 12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke] |
| 15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke] |
| 15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke] |
| 11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
| 11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
| 14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
| 12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke] |
| 12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke] |
| 12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke] |
| 12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke] |
| 11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke] |
| 11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
| 15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
| 11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
| 11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
| 11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
| 11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
| 9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
| 12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke] |
| 16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke] |
| 12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke] |
| 10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
| 13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke] |
| 16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke] |
| 16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke] |
| 12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke] |
| 12812 | Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke] |
| 16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle] |
| 12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke] |
| 15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke] |
| 12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke] |
| 16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke] |
| 13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke] |
| 12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke] |
| 12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke] |
| 12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke] |
| 12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke] |
| 13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke] |
| 13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke] |
| 12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke] |
| 12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke] |
| 12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
| 12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
| 12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
| 18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
| 12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
| 17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
| 12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke] |
| 11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
| 15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
| 16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke] |
| 12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke] |
| 15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
| 15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
| 15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
| 9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
| 9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
| 15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
| 9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
| 9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
| 11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
| 9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
| 17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
| 14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
| 11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
| 11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
| 11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
| 15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
| 12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke] |
| 9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
| 15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
| 15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
| 12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke] |
| 12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke] |
| 15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke] |
| 12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke] |
| 15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke] |
| 12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke] |
| 12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke] |
| 7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke] |
| 7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke] |
| 4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke] |
| 7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke] |
| 7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke] |
| 12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke] |
| 12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke] |
| 12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke] |
| 12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke] |
| 12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke] |
| 15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke] |
| 6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke] |
| 12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke] |
| 7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke] |
| 15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
| 12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke] |
| 7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke] |
| 12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke] |
| 12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke] |
| 12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke] |
| 16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke] |
| 2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J] |
| 12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke] |
| 19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke] |
| 15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke] |
| 2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty] |
| 9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
| 10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke] |
| 6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H] |
| 17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
| 17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
| 15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
| 16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke] |
| 15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke] |
| 12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke] |
| 5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke] |
| 2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke] |
| 2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke] |
| 3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke] |
| 7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke] |
| 12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke] |
| 12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke] |
| 9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke] |
| 7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke] |
| 9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
| 12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke] |
| 5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke] |
| 1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke] |
| 1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke] |
| 1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke] |
| 1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke] |
| 5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke] |
| 1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke] |
| 1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke] |
| 1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke] |
| 1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke] |
| 5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke] |
| 1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke] |
| 12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke] |
| 12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke] |
| 12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke] |
| 1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan] |
| 23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
| 6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke] |
| 5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke] |
| 1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke] |
| 1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke] |
| 1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke] |
| 12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke] |
| 1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke] |
| 21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke] |
| 1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke] |
| 12809 | Nothing about me is essential [Locke] |
| 3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke] |
| 12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke] |
| 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
| 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
| 7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke] |
| 17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
| 12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
| 15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
| 12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
| 6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
| 15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
| 15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke] |
| 6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke] |
| 12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke] |
| 12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke] |
| 17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke] |
| 12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke] |
| 5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke] |
| 9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
| 9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
| 10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
| 10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
| 9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
| 10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
| 10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
| 10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
| 10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
| 7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke] |
| 7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke] |
| 12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke] |
| 15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
| 15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
| 15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
| 15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
| 15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
| 15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
| 14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
| 14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
| 14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
| 9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
| 15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
| 15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
| 11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
| 11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
| 14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
| 9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
| 5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
| 15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke] |
| 4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke] |
| 12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke] |
| 12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke] |
| 12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke] |
| 1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke] |
| 4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke] |
| 12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke] |
| 19906 | All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke] |
| 19882 | We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke] |
| 19864 | In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke] |
| 19865 | There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke] |
| 19866 | The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke] |
| 19872 | The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke] |
| 19907 | There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke] |
| 19863 | Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke] |
| 5654 | The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton] |
| 19888 | A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke] |
| 6702 | If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke] |
| 19909 | A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke] |
| 19910 | A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke] |
| 19893 | Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke] |
| 19894 | You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke] |
| 19892 | Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke] |
| 19885 | Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke] |
| 19886 | The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke] |
| 19903 | Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke] |
| 19905 | People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke] |
| 19904 | Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke] |
| 19895 | Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke] |
| 19900 | The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke] |
| 19902 | Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke] |
| 19908 | Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke] |
| 19911 | If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke] |
| 19901 | The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke] |
| 19887 | Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke] |
| 19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke] |
| 19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke] |
| 19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke] |
| 19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke] |
| 19880 | All value depends on the labour involved [Locke] |
| 19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke] |
| 19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke] |
| 19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke] |
| 6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin] |
| 20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke] |
| 19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke] |
| 19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke] |
| 19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke] |
| 19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke] |
| 12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke] |
| 19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke] |
| 19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke] |
| 19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke] |
| 19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke] |
| 19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke] |
| 19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke] |
| 19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke] |
| 15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke] |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
| 15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke] |
| 15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke] |
| 15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke] |
| 12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke] |
| 23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |
| 12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke] |
| 9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke] |
| 15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke] |
| 7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke] |
| 12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke] |
| 12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke] |
| 15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke] |
| 15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke] |
| 15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
| 15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
| 15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
| 12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke] |
| 12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke] |
| 12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke] |
| 12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke] |
| 12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke] |
| 12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke] |
| 12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke] |