77 ideas
10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
14187 | If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read] |
10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
14188 | Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read] |
14182 | If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read] |
14183 | Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read] |
10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
14184 | In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read] |
14186 | Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read] |
10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
14185 | Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read] |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
22849 | Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet] |
22848 | People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet] |
22838 | Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet] |
22846 | The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet] |
22835 | Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet] |
22831 | Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet] |
22839 | Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet] |
22847 | Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet] |
22821 | Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet] |
22834 | Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet] |
22822 | Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet] |
22841 | Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet] |
22842 | For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet] |
22830 | Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet] |
22829 | Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet] |
22836 | 'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet] |
22837 | Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet] |
22844 | First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet] |
22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
22843 | Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet] |
22845 | Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet] |
22823 | The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet] |
22825 | The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet] |
22826 | From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet] |
22827 | Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet] |
22828 | The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet] |
22832 | Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet] |
651 | Eurytus showed that numbers underlie things by making pictures of creatures out of pebbles [Eurytus, by Aristotle] |