38 ideas
| 8623 | Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege] |
| 13907 | If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon] |
| 10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
| 10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
| 10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
| 10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
| 10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
| 10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
| 10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
| 6297 | Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik] |
| 9603 | An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR] |
| 9894 | A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid] |
| 8738 | Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro] |
| 22278 | Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid] |
| 8673 | Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend] |
| 10250 | Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid] |
| 10302 | Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays] |
| 14157 | Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid] |
| 1600 | Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik] |
| 23304 | The ancient Memorists said virtually all types of thinking could be done simply by memory [Sorabji] |
| 23303 | Stoics say true memory needs reflection and assent, but animals only have perceptual recognition [Sorabji] |
| 12900 | How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach] |
| 12901 | If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach] |
| 12902 | Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach] |
| 10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
| 10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
| 10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
| 10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
| 10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
| 10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
| 10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
| 10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
| 10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
| 10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
| 10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
| 10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
| 10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
| 10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |