42 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
8623 | Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege] |
13907 | If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon] |
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
6297 | Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik] |
9603 | An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR] |
9894 | A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid] |
8738 | Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro] |
22278 | Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid] |
8673 | Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend] |
10250 | Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid] |
10302 | Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays] |
14157 | Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid] |
1600 | Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
12750 | The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant] |
8915 | How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
8917 | The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen] |
8912 | Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen] |
8913 | Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen] |
8914 | Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen] |
8916 | Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen] |
8918 | Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen] |
8919 | Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |