Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, ystein Linnebo and M. Tullius Cicero

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79 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Cicero sees wisdom in terms of knowledge, but earlier Stoics saw it as moral [Cicero, by Long]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Unfortunately we choose a way of life before we are old enough to think clearly [Cicero]
A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments [Cicero]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo]
To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo]
Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo]
'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo]
'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo]
In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath [Cicero]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero]
The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be [Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero]
Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
All men except philosophers fear poverty [Cicero]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
The essence of propriety is consistency [Cicero]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively [Cicero]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero]
If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero]
If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero]
Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero]