58 ideas
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
6007 | If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
6008 | Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
4669 | Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover] |
8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
4656 | A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover] |
4657 | Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover] |
4658 | Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover] |
4659 | It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover] |
4660 | Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover] |
4661 | What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover] |
4648 | 'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover] |
3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
4650 | The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover] |
3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
4675 | The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover] |
4654 | Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover] |
4655 | If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover] |
4680 | Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover] |
4670 | Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover] |
4668 | You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover] |
4649 | If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover] |
4651 | Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover] |
4671 | What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover] |
4676 | The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover] |
4685 | Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover] |
4683 | Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover] |
4682 | Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover] |
4684 | Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover] |
4681 | The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover] |
4665 | Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover] |
4667 | How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover] |
4652 | If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover] |
4662 | Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover] |
4663 | If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover] |
4664 | If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover] |
4673 | Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover] |
4666 | If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover] |
4672 | Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover] |
4674 | It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover] |
4679 | One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |