Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Thomas M. Crisp and Richard Cartwright

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
9786 Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
9784 A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
14025 The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
14023 The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
14024 Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
14961 Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
14962 Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13952 Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13954 The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13955 Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14021 Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
14020 'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14026 Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
14022 The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM]