Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Robert S. Wolf and Thomas Grundmann

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29 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
13520 A 'tautology' must include connectives [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
13524 Deduction Theorem: T∪{P}|-Q, then T|-(P→Q), which justifies Conditional Proof [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
13521 Universal Specification: ∀xP(x) implies P(t). True for all? Then true for an instance [Wolf,RS]
13522 Universal Generalization: If we prove P(x) with no special assumptions, we can conclude ∀xP(x) [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
13523 Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): if we can say P(t), then we can say something is P [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / e. Axiom of the Empty Set IV
13529 Empty Set: ∃x∀y ¬(y∈x). The unique empty set exists [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
13526 Comprehension Axiom: if a collection is clearly specified, it is a set [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
13534 In first-order logic syntactic and semantic consequence (|- and |=) nicely coincide [Wolf,RS]
13535 First-order logic is weakly complete (valid sentences are provable); we can't prove every sentence or its negation [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
13519 Model theory uses sets to show that mathematical deduction fits mathematical truth [Wolf,RS]
13531 Model theory reveals the structures of mathematics [Wolf,RS]
13532 Model theory 'structures' have a 'universe', some 'relations', some 'functions', and some 'constants' [Wolf,RS]
13533 First-order model theory rests on completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
13537 An 'isomorphism' is a bijection that preserves all structural components [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
13539 The LST Theorem is a serious limitation of first-order logic [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
13538 If a theory is complete, only a more powerful language can strengthen it [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
13525 Most deductive logic (unlike ordinary reasoning) is 'monotonic' - we don't retract after new givens [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
13530 An ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings, or a transitive set whose members are transitive [Wolf,RS]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
13518 Modern mathematics has unified all of its objects within set theory [Wolf,RS]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]