Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Robert Hanna and Francesco Orsi

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45 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
11051 Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
11054 Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
11070 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna]
11071 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna]
11088 We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
11059 Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
11089 Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
11058 Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna]
11072 Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
11061 Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
11063 Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
11055 Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11083 A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
11086 Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
11084 Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11085 Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
11077 Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna]
11080 Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna]
11078 Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
11053 Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
11081 Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
11082 Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
11067 Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna]
11068 One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna]
11047 Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna]
11048 Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna]
11046 Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
11045 Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]