Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Richard Cartwright and Mark Rowlands

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
9786 Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
6161 Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
9784 A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
6163 If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
6155 Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
14961 Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
14962 Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
6154 It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13952 Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13954 The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13955 Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
6157 Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
6159 Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
6152 Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
6173 Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands]
6174 If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
6158 Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6168 The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
6167 Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6177 Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
6156 The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6170 Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
6178 It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands]