89 ideas
| 7490 | Because of Darwin, wisdom as a definite attainable state has faded [Watson] |
| 7461 | The three key ideas are the soul, Europe, and the experiment [Watson] |
| 7464 | The big idea: imitation, the soul, experiments, God, heliocentric universe, evolution? [Watson] |
| 13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
| 7465 | Babylonian thinking used analogy, rather than deduction or induction [Watson] |
| 6007 | If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 6008 | Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 7466 | Mesopotamian numbers applied to specific things, and then became abstract [Watson] |
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
| 12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
| 13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
| 7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
| 13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
| 7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
| 7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
| 7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
| 7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
| 7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
| 7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
| 7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
| 7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
| 7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
| 7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
| 7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
| 7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
| 7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
| 20657 | There are 23 core brain functions, with known circuit, transmitters, genes and behaviour [Watson] |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
| 7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
| 20656 | Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson] |
| 7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
| 20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
| 7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
| 7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
| 7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
| 7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
| 16369 | There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati] |
| 7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
| 7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
| 7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
| 13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
| 7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
| 7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
| 7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
| 20655 | Humans have been hunter-gatherers for 99.5% of their existence [Watson] |
| 7477 | Modern democracy is actually elective oligarchy [Watson] |
| 7478 | Greek philosophers invented the concept of 'nature' as their special subject [Watson] |
| 20650 | The Uncertainty Principle implies that cause and effect can't be measured [Watson] |
| 7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
| 7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
| 20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
| 20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
| 20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
| 20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |
| 20649 | The interference of light through two slits confirmed that it is waves [Watson] |
| 20661 | Electrons rotate in hyrogen atoms 10^13 times per second [Watson] |
| 20647 | Quantum theory explains why nature is made up of units, such as elements [Watson] |
| 20654 | Only four particles are needed for matter: up and down quark, electron, electron-neutrino [Watson] |
| 20651 | The shape of molecules is important, as well as the atoms and their bonds [Watson] |
| 20652 | In 1828 the animal substance urea was manufactured from inorganic ingredients [Watson] |
| 20658 | Information is physical, and living can be seen as replicating and preserving information [Watson] |
| 7462 | DNA mutation suggests humans and chimpanzees diverged 6.6 million years ago [Watson] |
| 7470 | During the rise of civilizations, the main gods changed from female to male [Watson] |
| 7474 | Hinduism has no founder, or prophet, or creed, or ecclesiastical structure [Watson] |
| 7480 | Monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East [Watson] |
| 7479 | Modern Judaism became stabilised in 200 CE [Watson] |
| 7481 | The Israelites may have asserted the uniqueness of Yahweh to justify land claims [Watson] |
| 7471 | The Gathas (hymns) of Zoroastrianism date from about 1000 BCE [Watson] |
| 7473 | Zoroaster conceived the afterlife, judgement, heaven and hell, and the devil [Watson] |
| 7484 | Jesus never intended to start a new religion [Watson] |
| 7483 | Paul's early writings mention few striking episodes from Jesus' life [Watson] |
| 7475 | Confucius revered the spiritual world, but not the supernatural, or a personal god, or the afterlife [Watson] |
| 7476 | Taoism aims at freedom from the world, the body, the mind, and nature [Watson] |
| 7463 | The three basic ingredients of religion are: the soul, seers or priests, and ritual [Watson] |
| 7468 | In ancient Athens the souls of the dead are received by the 'upper air' [Watson] |