Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Penelope Mackie and Keith Devlin

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
8092 Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
8081 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8085 Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
8086 Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
8091 Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
8087 Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin]
8089 Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
8082 Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8072 Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
8075 Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
8088 People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
8073 How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
8076 The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]