61 ideas
20981 | What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen] |
20982 | In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen] |
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
6007 | If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
6008 | Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
20990 | Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
21005 | A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen] |
20983 | The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen] |
20987 | The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen] |
20984 | A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen] |
20986 | A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen] |
21001 | Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen] |
21002 | Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen] |
20999 | Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen] |
20979 | Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen] |
20993 | Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen] |
20995 | Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen] |
20998 | Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen] |
20997 | The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen] |
20996 | All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen] |
20988 | Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen] |
20980 | You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen] |
20978 | Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen] |
20985 | Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen] |
20994 | We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen] |
21000 | If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |