Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Karl Marx and Bernard Williams

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99 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change it [Marx]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Whether human thinking can be 'true' must be decided in practice, not theory [Marx]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B]
Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
The authentic self exists at the level of class, rather than the individual [Marx, by Dunt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The human essence is not found in individuals but in social relations [Marx]
We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Armies and businesses create moralities in which their activity can do no wrong [Marx, by Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B]
Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B]
"Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B]
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]
For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B]
Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The real will of the cooperative will replace the 'will of the people' [Marx]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
The middle class gain freedom through property, but workers can only free all of humanity [Marx, by Singer]
Theory is as much a part of a revolution as material force is [Marx]
In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberal freedom is the right to be separate, and ignores the union of man with man [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberals want the right to be separate, rather than for people to be united [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Early Marx anticipates communitarian objections to liberalism [Marx, by Oksala]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Man is dominated by money, which is the essence of his alienation [Marx]
From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx]
By saying the material dialectic of history aspires to the best, Marx agreed with capitalism [Weil on Marx]
False consciousness results from concealment by the superstructure [Marx, by Singer]
Marx says force is everything, and that the weak will become strong, while remaining the weak [Weil on Marx]
Must production determine superstructure, or could it be the other way round? [Singer on Marx]
Marx rejected equal rights because they never actually treat people as equals [Marx, by Kymlicka]
Even decently paid workers still have their produce bought with money stolen from them [Marx]
People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx]
Freedom only comes when labour is no longer necessary [Marx]
Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The handmill gives feudalism, the steam mill capitalism [Marx]
Capitalism changes the world, by socialising the idea of a commodity [Marx, by Bowie]
The essence of capitalism is the subordination of people to things [Marx, by Weil]
Marx thought capitalism was partly liberating, and could make labour and ownership more humane [Marx, by Bowie]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B]
Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Marxists say liberal rights are confrontational, and liberal equality is a sham [Marx, by Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the opium of the people, and real happiness requires its abolition [Marx]
Religious feeling is social in origin [Marx]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]