Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Julien Offray de La Mettrie and Scott Soames

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie]