Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Joseph Melia and Gordon Graham

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34 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
5750 Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
5737 Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
5744 First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
5740 Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
5741 If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
5736 No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
5735 Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
5746 The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
5738 We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
5732 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
5739 Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
5734 Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
5742 In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
5743 If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
5749 Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
5751 The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
6685 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5748 We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
6699 The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6698 Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
6700 We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
6704 Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
6701 Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6693 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
6691 It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
6688 Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
6705 Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
6690 A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
6689 The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
6706 The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
6709 Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham]