47 ideas
| 7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
| 7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
| 7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
| 10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
| 10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
| 10844 | The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P] |
| 10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P] |
| 8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P] |
| 6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling] |
| 8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P] |
| 6007 | If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 6008 | Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 16980 | We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P] |
| 16979 | It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P] |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| 9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
| 9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
| 8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P] |
| 10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury] |
| 10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P] |
| 8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
| 8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |
| 9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |