Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Gareth Evans and Laozi (Lao Tzu)

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / g. Desires
There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]