35 ideas
| 8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
| 8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
| 8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
| 8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
| 8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
| 8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
| 8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
| 6007 | If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 6008 | Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
| 8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
| 8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
| 5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
| 5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
| 6445 | You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose] |
| 19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
| 19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
| 19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
| 19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
| 19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
| 19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
| 19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |
| 8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
| 5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
| 5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
| 5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
| 5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
| 5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
| 5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
| 5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
| 5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |
| 8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
| 8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
| 8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |