39 ideas
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
6007 | If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
6008 | Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
8923 | Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride] |
8926 | For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride] |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
21354 | It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride] |
21353 | Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride] |
21352 | 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride] |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
9758 | To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard] |
9757 | A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard] |
9759 | Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard] |
18678 | Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi] |
18225 | If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard] |
18228 | An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard] |
9760 | Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard] |
18224 | Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard] |
9761 | Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard] |
18233 | Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard] |
18226 | For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard] |