Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Frank Jackson and Peter Watson

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87 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Because of Darwin, wisdom as a definite attainable state has faded [Watson]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
The three key ideas are the soul, Europe, and the experiment [Watson]
The big idea: imitation, the soul, experiments, God, heliocentric universe, evolution? [Watson]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Babylonian thinking used analogy, rather than deduction or induction [Watson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Mesopotamian numbers applied to specific things, and then became abstract [Watson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington]
There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington]
Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]
Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]
Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
There are 23 core brain functions, with known circuit, transmitters, genes and behaviour [Watson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Humans have been hunter-gatherers for 99.5% of their existence [Watson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Modern democracy is actually elective oligarchy [Watson]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Greek philosophers invented the concept of 'nature' as their special subject [Watson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The Uncertainty Principle implies that cause and effect can't be measured [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
The interference of light through two slits confirmed that it is waves [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons rotate in hyrogen atoms 10^13 times per second [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum theory explains why nature is made up of units, such as elements [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Only four particles are needed for matter: up and down quark, electron, electron-neutrino [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
The shape of molecules is important, as well as the atoms and their bonds [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
In 1828 the animal substance urea was manufactured from inorganic ingredients [Watson]
Information is physical, and living can be seen as replicating and preserving information [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
DNA mutation suggests humans and chimpanzees diverged 6.6 million years ago [Watson]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
During the rise of civilizations, the main gods changed from female to male [Watson]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Hinduism has no founder, or prophet, or creed, or ecclesiastical structure [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Modern Judaism became stabilised in 200 CE [Watson]
The Israelites may have asserted the uniqueness of Yahweh to justify land claims [Watson]
Monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 3. Zoroastrianism
The Gathas (hymns) of Zoroastrianism date from about 1000 BCE [Watson]
Zoroaster conceived the afterlife, judgement, heaven and hell, and the devil [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Jesus never intended to start a new religion [Watson]
Paul's early writings mention few striking episodes from Jesus' life [Watson]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 1. Confucianism
Confucius revered the spiritual world, but not the supernatural, or a personal god, or the afterlife [Watson]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
Taoism aims at freedom from the world, the body, the mind, and nature [Watson]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The three basic ingredients of religion are: the soul, seers or priests, and ritual [Watson]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
In ancient Athens the souls of the dead are received by the 'upper air' [Watson]