Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Francis Hutcheson and Adrian Bardon

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47 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon]
The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon]
The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon]
We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon]
The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon]
The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon]
It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon]
We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon]
Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / j. Time travel
At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon]
Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]