Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, David Hilbert and B Russell/AN Whitehead

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58 ideas

3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
You would cripple mathematics if you denied Excluded Middle [Hilbert]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert]
Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend]
I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert]
We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Hilbert aimed to eliminate number from geometry [Hilbert, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert]
We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert]
Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid axioms concerns possibilities of construction, but Hilbert's assert the existence of objects [Hilbert, by Chihara]
Hilbert's formalisation revealed implicit congruence axioms in Euclid [Hilbert, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers [Hilbert, by Field,H]
The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes]
Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman]
The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert]
In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert]
Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman]
Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter]
The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman]
Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead]
The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead]
The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead]
Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert]