Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Christopher Peacocke and Steven Pinker

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34 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Good reductionism connects fields of knowledge, but doesn't replace one with another [Pinker]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Connectionists say the mind is a general purpose learning device [Pinker]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Is memory stored in protein sequences, neurons, synapses, or synapse-strengths? [Pinker]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Roundworms live successfully with 302 neurons, so human freedom comes from our trillions [Pinker]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Neural networks can generalise their training, e.g. truths about tigers apply mostly to lions [Pinker]
There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems [Pinker, by PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Many think that accepting human nature is to accept innumerable evils [Pinker]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
In 1828, the stuff of life was shown to be ordinary chemistry, not a magic gel [Pinker]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
All the evidence says evolution is cruel and wasteful, not intelligent [Pinker]
Intelligent Design says that every unexplained phenomenon must be design, by default [Pinker]