46 ideas
| 12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
| 4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
| 6007 | If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 6008 | Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
| 12155 | Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry] |
| 4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
| 4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
| 12149 | Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry] |
| 12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
| 12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
| 4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
| 4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
| 4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
| 12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
| 4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
| 12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
| 16391 | Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati] |
| 4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
| 4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
| 18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| 11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
| 12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
| 12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
| 12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
| 12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
| 12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
| 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
| 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
| 12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
| 9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
| 9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
| 12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
| 12151 | If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry] |
| 18412 | Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
| 4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
| 15203 | Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
| 15204 | Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |