100 ideas
23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
3449 | If parallelism is true, how does the mind know about the body? [Crease] |
7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
16369 | There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati] |
7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |
23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |