290 ideas
7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
8988 | Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology [Scruton] |
8987 | On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away [Scruton] |
8992 | Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive [Scruton] |
18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
8828 | Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam] |
7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
10066 | Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave] |
18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
18200 | Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
3663 | How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam] |
9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
18199 | Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam] |
8857 | We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
18890 | Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam] |
4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
10269 | Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam] |
9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
3460 | Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle] |
2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
5495 | Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
2605 | If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam] |
2606 | No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam] |
5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
4099 | If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane] |
12026 | We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam] |
3208 | Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey] |
14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |
14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
3893 | Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton] |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
12156 | Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton] |
12158 | Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton] |
18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton] |
18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
12165 | Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton] |
18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
12167 | Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton] |
12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton] |
12166 | If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton] |
12168 | Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton] |
23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton] |
12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton] |
12164 | Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton] |
12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton] |
4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |
18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
8989 | The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton] |
23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
8990 | So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton] |
7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |
7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |
4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
11191 | The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
11192 | If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE] |
11190 | Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam] |
5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |
23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |