Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Epictetus, Hilary Putnam and Roger Scruton

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290 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus]
Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus]
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus]
The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton]
Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton]
Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton]
The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam]
A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away [Scruton]
Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive [Scruton]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam]
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
'⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam]
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam]
Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam]
It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam]
Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam]
We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam]
Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam]
Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis]
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady]
Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam]
Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton]
Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus]
Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus]
We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus]
Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle]
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam]
Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam]
If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam]
No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam]
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
"Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam]
Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam]
Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam]
Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam]
Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam]
Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam]
Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam]
Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam]
A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton]
Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton]
The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton]
Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton]
Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton]
Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton]
Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton]
If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus]
Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus]
We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus]
Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton]
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton]
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton]
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton]
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton]
The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus]
A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton]
So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus]
Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton]
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton]
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton]
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton]
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton]
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton]
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton]
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton]
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton]
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton]
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton]
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton]
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton]
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
"Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam]
Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus]