Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Epictetus, Hermarchus and J Ladyman / D Ross

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106 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus]
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross]
Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross]
Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross]
Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross]
Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross]
We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross]
The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross]
Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross]
Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross]
A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross]
There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross]
There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross]
In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross]
The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus]
Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus]
Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross]
If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus]
Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus]
We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus]
I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus]
A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus]
Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross]
In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross]
If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus]