104 ideas
| 23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
| 23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| 21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
| 20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
| 6575 | Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin] |
| 6585 | Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin] |
| 23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
| 6557 | Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin] |
| 6568 | A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin] |
| 23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
| 6560 | The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin] |
| 9123 | Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen] |
| 6565 | The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin] |
| 6574 | Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin] |
| 8720 | A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend] |
| 9672 | Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G] |
| 9697 | X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G] |
| 9685 | <a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G] |
| 9675 | a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G] |
| 9674 | {x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G] |
| 9673 | {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G] |
| 9677 | Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G] |
| 9676 | {a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G] |
| 9679 | X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
| 9678 | X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
| 9681 | X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G] |
| 9683 | X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G] |
| 9682 | X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G] |
| 9684 | Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G] |
| 9694 | The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G] |
| 9693 | The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G] |
| 9692 | The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G] |
| 9698 | The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G] |
| 9688 | A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G] |
| 9687 | A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G] |
| 9695 | An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G] |
| 9696 | A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G] |
| 9686 | A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G] |
| 9689 | The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G] |
| 9690 | A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G] |
| 9691 | A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G] |
| 9680 | The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G] |
| 13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
| 13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
| 13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
| 13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
| 13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
| 13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
| 13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
| 13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
| 6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
| 23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
| 23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
| 6576 | My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin] |
| 6589 | Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin] |
| 6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
| 6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
| 6588 | Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin] |
| 6590 | Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin] |
| 6583 | Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin] |
| 23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
| 23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
| 23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
| 23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
| 23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
| 23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
| 20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
| 23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
| 6555 | We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin] |
| 23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
| 6605 | Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin] |
| 6607 | The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin] |
| 20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
| 23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
| 6604 | Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin] |
| 23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
| 23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
| 6586 | Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin] |
| 23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
| 23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
| 23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
| 23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
| 23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
| 23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
| 23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
| 23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
| 23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
| 23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
| 4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
| 23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
| 23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
| 23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
| 23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
| 20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
| 23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
| 22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
| 23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
| 6572 | Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin] |
| 6573 | Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin] |
| 23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
| 23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
| 23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
| 23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |