Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Epictetus, Democritus and Michael Jubien

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151 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus]
Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus]
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle]
To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien]
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien]
If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien]
Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Man is separated from reality [Democritus]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus]
Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle]
We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus]
We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus]
It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus]
We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero]
Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius]
The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus]
Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus]
We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero]
Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero]
If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus]
Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus]
We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus]
Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus]
A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus]
Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg]
Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus]
If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus]
Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle]
There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen]
If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus]
Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus]
Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus]
Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus]