150 ideas
22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
9987 | An aggregate in which order does not matter I call a 'set' [Bolzano] |
9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
10856 | A truly infinite quantity does not need to be a variable [Bolzano] |
9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |
23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
22480 | Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot] |
23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
22393 | I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot] |
23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
22481 | There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG] |
22482 | I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot] |
22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
4692 | It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot] |
4694 | Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot] |
20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
23683 | Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
22485 | Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot] |
22474 | Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot] |
23684 | Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23690 | We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
22477 | Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot] |
22486 | The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot] |
23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
22487 | Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot] |
22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |
23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
22381 | Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot] |
23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
22379 | The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot] |
22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
22478 | The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot] |
23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
23692 | Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot] |
23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
22456 | Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot] |
22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
22472 | The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot] |
22479 | Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot] |
22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |
4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
22395 | Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot] |
22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
4693 | The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot] |
22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |
23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
22380 | Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot] |
23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |