51 ideas
18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
13913 | The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13914 | Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
13915 | Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13916 | Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
13850 | In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13849 | Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13851 | Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
13852 | Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo] |
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |