Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C, Timothy McGrew and Jean Buridan

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1403 A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
13913 The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
13914 Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13915 Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
13916 Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
13850 In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
13849 Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13851 Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
13852 Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16678 Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
16793 A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
16726 Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683 Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
16577 Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19685 Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
16576 Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]