Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C, Robert van Gulick and Peter Unger

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
9327 Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
13913 The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
13914 Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13915 Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
13916 Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
13850 In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
13849 Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13851 Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
13852 Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9052 Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
16070 There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
9325 In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
9326 Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
8724 The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
8722 No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
8723 An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
9319 Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9320 Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
9321 Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
9322 Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
9324 From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick]