35 ideas
| 13913 | The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13914 | Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13915 | Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13916 | Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13850 | In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13849 | Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13851 | Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13852 | Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
| 17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
| 17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
| 17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
| 17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |
| 17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
| 17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
| 17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
| 17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
| 17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
| 23708 | Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG] |
| 23709 | Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23707 | Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23711 | A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23712 | Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23698 | Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23699 | 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23700 | A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23701 | A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23702 | A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23703 | Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23704 | We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
| 17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
| 23706 | Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |