Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C, Nathan Salmon and Michael Walzer

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71 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
18889 Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
13913 The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
13914 Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13915 Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
13916 Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
14684 A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14669 For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
14667 System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
14668 In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
14692 System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14671 What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14627 S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
14686 S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
14691 S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
14693 The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
14670 Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
13850 In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
13849 Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13851 Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
13852 Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
14742 It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
18888 Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680 Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681 Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676 Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689 Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674 Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
14682 Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14672 Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
14675 Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673 You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
18886 Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
18887 The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
18885 Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
23590 Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
23578 Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
23564 Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
20595 You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
20592 Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
20549 Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
23568 If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
23581 The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
23567 Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer]
23570 The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer]
23571 States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer]
23582 Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer]
23580 States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer]
23588 With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer]
23572 Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer]
23587 Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
23577 Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer]
23593 Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer]
23573 For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
23589 Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer]
23614 Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer]
23574 The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer]
23575 We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer]
23584 Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
23579 Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer]
23586 What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer]
23591 If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
23592 We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
18891 Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]